Abstract
Why do some secessions produce peace and order, while others lead to violence and instability? Related, why does conflict emerge in some regions and not in others? This essay challenges five prominent explanations and advances an alternative theory. The core argument rests upon a curvilinear conceptualization of ethno-territorial heterogeneity and emphasizes the role of external actors in the escalation and diffusion of internal conflicts. The South Caucasus offers an unrivaled laboratory for examining the rival logics. Georgia, in particular, possesses four ethnically defined regions with serious secessionist potential: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli. The former two are virtually synonymous with ethnic secessionist conflict, while the latter two avoided large-scale violence. Drawing upon archival evidence, elite interviews, and district-level data collected in Georgia, the analysis evaluates the relative consistency of the various competing theoretical expectations with the empirical record. Controlling for factors which vary across states but remain largely constant within them, the article shows how external support, by increasing expectations of success, and competitive ethnic heterogeneity, by increasing fears of demographic extinction, and played crucial roles in the escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conversely, neighboring ethnic kin states and regional ethnic hom*ogeneity, which many believe cause secessionism, actually mitigated separatist sentiments in two of Georgia’s other ethnic regions - Armenian Javakheti and Azeri Kvemo-Kartli.
